Large sections of society had found an accommodation with Karimov’s “Uzbek development model” – not necessarily to their disadvantage.
While public resistance to the new president was not expected, unconditional support for his reform agenda was not either. It was therefore central for Mirziyoyev to create a loyal inner circle and to secure his position through institutional measures and strategic appointments. It was by no means certain that they would support the new course set by his successor.
There were several candidates to succeed Karimov, whose policies had greatly benefitted large sections of the elites. Foreign policy also plays a decisive role for the success of the reform project. Three strategically relevant areas can be identified: reorganising the security apparatus, modernising cadres and governance, and mobilising society. Many of the proposed policy measures are in fact designed to anchor the reform concept within the elites and across society, and to ensure that the changes are irreversible. The reform programme laid out in the Development Strategy for 2017 to 2021 is so comprehensive and ambitious that implementation would appear to require a mobilisation of all relevant actors. This raises the question of the objectives and durability of the Uzbek transition. Power struggles within the elites and public unrest had been regarded as more plausible (as in the “colour revolutions” in Georgia 2003, Kyrgyzstan 2005, and the Ukrainian “Euromaidan” of 2013), or a new leader continuing the old political course (Azerbaijan 2003, Turkmenistan 2006 and Kazakhstan 2019). In every respect, the transition in Uzbekistan represents a novelty in the post-Soviet space: The scenario of a peaceful succession by a regime insider promising fundamental political change had been regarded as extremely unlikely.
President Mirziyoyev, who presents himself as the reformer personified, tirelessly underlines the strategic importance of the reforms and rallies support for the project. Transformation to a market economy, modernisation of the administration and liberalisation of society are the overarching goals of the state development programme. After two decades of economic and political isolation under Karimov, Mirziyoyev immediately launched reforms designed to prepare the ground for economic liberalisation, attract outside investment to develop untapped economic potential, and bring Uzbekistan up to the level of developed countries. Initial doubts that the new leader would really pursue a course out of post-Soviet stagnation have been swept away. Since President Shavkat Mirziyoyev succeeded Islom Karimov in December 2016 Uzbekistan has presented the image of a state under renewal. Priority should be placed on the areas most relevant for fostering an open society: promoting political competition, encouraging open debate, fostering independent public engagement and enabling genuine participation. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for Germany and Europe to support the reforms. Rather than democratisation, the outcome of the transformation is more likely to be “enlightened authoritarianism” backed by an alliance of old and new elites. Uzbekistan has also made significant moves towards political liberalisation, but remains an authoritarian state whose institutional framework and presidential system are not up for discussion. And the economic reforms are rapidly creating incontrovertible facts on the ground. Uzbeks accept painful adjustments in the expectation of a rising standard of living. Implementation is centrally controlled and managed, in line with the country’s long history of state planning. His reform programme aims to liberalise the economy and society while leaving the political system largely untouched. Regime insider Shavkat Mirziyoyev has succeeded in initiating change without provoking destabilisation. The presidential transition in Uzbekistan represents a novel development in the post-Soviet space.